Are we asking enough hard questions about Ukraine?

When the dust settles, will the West’s media coverage get a passing grade, or will we find, at times, we allowed our sympathy for the Ukrainian cause to overlook matters we shouldn’t?

Sep 20, 2024 - 13:00
Are we asking enough hard questions about Ukraine?

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor at POLITICO Europe.

KYIV — Are we getting caught in an information trap when it comes to Ukraine?

This wouldn’t be unusual — it’s what happened in the run-up to the post-9/11 Iraq war, when American and British media were arguably far too unquestioning of Western officials’ claims that Saddam Hussein was awfully close to having a nuclear bomb or had a huge stockpile of weapons of mass destruction.

There was then British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s “dodgy dossier” and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s defining speech at the U.N. Security Council, where the formerly staunch critic of intervention announced Washington had solid evidence of sophisticated and illicit Iraqi weapons programs. But there was insufficient media skepticism overall, and alternative voices and awkward questions were all too often crowded out.

Unfortunately, it seems we’re now in danger of repeating this very same mistake, as we all too quickly dub those who question current Western strategy as defeatists or accuse them of advancing Russian propaganda.

The information trap we’re caught in isn’t one that overplays the true menace of Russian President Vladimir Putin — his thuggish, antediluvian nastiness; the bestial nature of his army’s atrocious behavior; his unlawful and detestable deportations (many of them children) from occupied parts of Ukraine to Russia — all echoing some of the worst episodes of a dark and hideous European past. Nor does it downplay the threat to democracies posed by his axis of autocrats and their antagonism toward classic liberal values.

The question is whether all this is blinding us, leading us to overlook the skepticism needed when considering whether this war is winnable — as in, can Russian forces be ejected from the 20 percent of Ukraine they’ve seized? Are we properly questioning some of the key assumptions underpinning the West’s strategy? Assumptions like Ukraine being the first stage of a broader Russian master plan to launch a land attack on NATO; that the fates of Ukraine and Europe are absolutely synonymous; or that Western sanctions will inevitably wreck Russia’s economy.

There are certainly credible and cogent arguments to the contrary, such as those stating that a weakened Russia simply won’t have the wherewithal to attack NATO anytime soon, whether it wins or loses, and that Putin’s forces are clearly no match for sophisticated, well-equipped Western armies. And in the meantime, are we not running down Western inventories to a dangerous degree?

Problem is, we’re not hearing these counter-arguments enough in mainstream Western publications, or at the high-level conferences that bring Western and Ukrainian officials together — like last weekend’s annual Yalta European Strategy (YES) Conference held in Kyiv.

In fact, such fundamental questions weren’t raised in the formal sessions or on the margins of the YES conference. Instead, much like at other security conferences, there was a fair share of the “Russians are coming,” of “one more heave and Putin will buckle,” and talk of this or that game-changing weapon. 

We’ve had many alleged game-changing weapons these past two-and-a-half years, and most Western media happily lap up claims that this or that missile, plane or artillery piece will change battlefield dynamics. But as Ukraine’s former armed forces commander General Valery Zaluzhny used to say, according to those who served under him, this is a “War of One Chance.”

“By that, he meant weapons systems become redundant very quickly because they’re quickly countered by the Russians … They don’t give us a second chance,” an officer told Unpacked earlier this year.

And when questioned one-on-one about, say, whether the war is winnable in the maximal sense, or asked what the West’s war aims are and why they’ve never really debated or clearly outlined them aside from saying they’ll back Ukraine for as long as it takes, conference participants shifted uneasily, with most still subscribing — admittedly self-consciously — to the overall stated goal of returning Ukraine to its 1991 borders, including Crimea.

Putin’s forces are clearly no match for sophisticated, well-equipped Western armies. | Alexander Nemenov/Getty Images

Speaking at the conference via video, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said: “Any plan that basically aims to dictate peace conditions on Ukraine … is not sustainable,” underlining the importance of the long-stated principle that nothing will be decided about Ukraine without Ukraine agreeing. And that’s praiseworthy — modern European history is full of big powers making dirty deals that override national wishes, from the ignoble Munich Agreement to the 1945 Yalta Conference that put the Iron Curtain in place. But there’s an even older axiom to consider: He who pays the piper calls the tune.

So, what tune should be called here? At the moment, few Western leaders are publicly suggesting the way things are going is hopeless, with no real endgame in sight, and can no longer continue in this way. And while some are muttering about explored negotiations privately, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz seems to be the rare exception to speak publicly.

While visiting Kazakhstan this week, Scholz told journalists it was time to think seriously about talks. “Russia has attacked Ukraine. That’s why Germany, like many other countries around the world, supports Ukraine. This is the way it is and will remain so that the country can defend itself, protect its integrity and sovereignty. But we are also clear that at the same time it remains necessary to explore the possibilities of opening up peaceful development,” he said.

According to German media reports, Scholz is working on a peace formula that would involve Ukraine ceding some territory — but that wasn’t something YES participants were prepared to endorse, even privately. When asked about borders, most participants simply ran to Sullivan’s formula for cover — nothing should be imposed on Ukraine.

The most sophisticated, and ambiguous, answer Unpacked got was from former U.S. President George W. Bush’s Ambassador to NATO and Donald Trump’s Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker: “Winning is when Russia concludes that it has to stop. Right now, Putin has no reason to stop fighting.”

“I’m not making any assumptions about where the final international border should be. Maybe it is back to the borders of 1991, especially if Russian forces collapse — and that’s not out of the question. But it doesn’t necessarily mean it’s the 1991 border,” he said.

It’s now time for the West to do some hard thinking — and have some hard discussions. And while leaders can’t be too public for the sake of Ukrainian morale and the war effort, it’s up to the media to start testing assumptions and asking tough questions. Questions like is this war winnable in the maximal sense? And if it is, can it be won with the current Western approach of foot-dragging when it comes to supplies or maintaining restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles? And if the West isn’t prepared to do much more, what then? Prolonged war?

Such questions are being asked by ordinary Ukrainians every day. One I’ve been hearing for days now on the streets of Kyiv and Lviv is: “How can we win a war when Russia can mobilize so much more manpower than us?” Or, as one office secretary said: “The war can’t go on for much longer because we just don’t have enough men.”

Others see a lack of honesty from Ukraine’s Western partners and complain allies need to be transparent about whether they can muster the will and weapons, retool at speed and scale their industry to produce enough to smash Russia’s forces. If not — if they won’t or can’t deliver, or fear nuclear escalation — then they need to come clean. Otherwise, as a 35-year-old fixer told me, ” it’s unfair to the men dying in the trenches.”

We, as journalists, need to ask ourselves some difficult questions too. When this war is over, will the West’s media coverage — especially its English-language coverage — get a passing grade? Or will we find it, at times, allowed its sympathy for the Ukrainian cause — a sympathy I fully share — to overlook matters it shouldn’t have and be satisfied with slogans like “for as longs it takes?”

The West has to be honest with about what’s possible and what isn’t, and shape policy accordingly. And the media has a key part to play, pushing questions we urgently need answers to.

What's Your Reaction?

like

dislike

love

funny

angry

sad

wow